Results Speak for Themselves - A Township Fiscal Review from the Plan to the Results

If you've arrived here from a link and read the intro already skip down the page to the details - skip down to the detailed review on the Township's Revenue

I want to acknowledge a lot of good work has gone into the ‘Fiscal” dialogue regarding the Townships finances - with a big shout out to Mike Parker and others for bringing much of this to the forefront; creating the needed awareness surrounding the financial situation the Township is in; the impact it WILL have on all property owners and potentially EVEN MORE serious consequences.

Anyone that is dismissing this in anyway - to yourself or others; I encourage you, challenge you, please take note.

In my experience, if someone’s running towards me on the street waving their arms - Its for my benefit or someone else's. Probably wise to at least stop and ask them “Why?”

There’s a classic leadership quote by Max Dupree, CEO of Herman Miller,

“The first responsibility of leaders is to define reality…”

this is in part, is my attempt to understand more of what we face- and to share it with you openly.

It takes a bit of work to wrap ones head around a municipality's financial health.

In everything, if you don’t have health, or operate in an unhealthy way - there is always an eventual reckoning. There will be small warning signs or signals along the way - and if one’s prudent - we’d all do well to listen.

Eventually - occasional lax practices turn into bad habits, bad habits lead to chronic conditions, chronic conditions lead to serious life consequences and if we don’t make changes to when those life consequences occur - well the results speak for themselves.

This applies to finances as well and for our purposes - I’m talking about the Township’s

Simply put, WE have a chronic condition - and that requires a serious lifestyle change before things get much worse.

Continuing to dismiss this and established municipal fiscal safeguards, and proper governance processes as has been equally witnessed federally and provincially is at our fiscal peril.

I have one more caveat -

I’m NOT a nay-sayer, NOT anti-growth, a pessimist by any stretch. I am full of optimism for the Township - we have so much going for us.

BUT as one who’s never been reticent to challenge, advocate or speak up, this is key…

HOW that happens makes all the difference.

HOW determines whether you’re working constructively or destructively. My aim is to always contribute, direct and be constructive - however different the opinion.

SOURCES

All of the information I’m sharing with you are from 2 sources :

- the Annual Financial Reports from the Township with audited financial statement.

- the Townships annual 5 year Fiscal plans approved in Bylaw form.

Both were used to review the last 4 years.

That’s about as simple and straight forward as you can get. Both are consistent for comparison purposes and information is wholly supplied and approved by Council.

That said - there are alot of gaps and serious transparency issues. I’ll do my best to fill in and provide some opinions, commentary and perspective

And for those who want a simple couple paragraph, plain-language summary and want to reads nothing else, read below. If your interested in more - keep on reading …

The FACTS

PROPERTY TAX and levies grew from $175 million in 2023 to $216 million in 2026 - a $40 million increase over the last 4 years - roughly 23.5% or 6% a year.

Between 2023 and 2026 the Township of Langley's OPERATING COSTS grew by nearly $100 million in three years - a 32% increase or 9.8% - 50% more than the rate of property taxes

DEBT payments will climb from $53 million this year to $73 million by 2030.

Property taxes have a “place holder” HIKE of 22.9% in 2027 alone… not over 4 years.

Out dated and under-valued DCC’s (Developer fees) collected over the last near dedade, provided a short-fall in cash, the money actually meant to fund growth infrastructure missing their planned targets by tens of millions of dollars over two of the past three years.

$63 million dollars in GRANT shortfalls over 2 years accelerated funding shortfalls

The Township has crossed into NET DEBT; meaning it owes more than it has, for the first time ever, and that SHORTFALL GREW from $8.5 million to $131 million in a single year.

The total debt load jumped 84% in 2025 alone. The majority of Council has now legally authorized borrowing $334 million more in 2026; on top of what is already owed

Every major promise about community amenities

a Willoughby recreation centre (and others)

a performing arts centre, has no dedicated, traceable funding source in any public document.

 A CLEAN AUDIT DOES NOT MEAN any of this was wise. It just means the math adds up.

The decisions behind the math are a completely different question entirely.

The opinions and my commentary provided are meant to hopefully fill in the gaps in understanding

For the complete detailed review - KEEP READING FROM HERE ON -

PART 1 — REVENUE: WHERE THE MONEY COMES FROM

The Numbers - Sourced from Annual Audits and the approved 5 Year Fiscal Plans

Notes on budget 2026 

• The 2026 bylaw budget splits utility and other service fees into separate lines, not directly comparable to prior years' combined figure.

• The 2026 figure represents authorized transfers from the Development Cost Charge Reserve fund for capital projects, not cash collected in 2026. This is a different measure than the annual collection figures shown for 2023–2025.

• The $1.26 billion 2026 total is the full consolidated budget, operating plus capital, including borrowing proceeds and internal fund transfers that appear on both the revenue and expenditure side. It is not a revenue increase. It is a different reporting framework. Comparing it directly to the $601M annual report total is invalid and misleading.

1A. Property Tax - The One True Number

Property tax is the most transparent line in the budget. 

Council sets the rate, it is applied to every property's assessed value, and the bill goes out. 

It grew from $175 million in 2023 to $202.9 million in 2025 - a $27.8 million increase in two years, without counting 2026.

The 2026 budget sets the levy at $216.3 million, up $13.4 million from 2025 actuals.

The “placeholder” - a 22.9% hike planned in 2027 alone.

That is an increase of $49.6 million - 22.9% , in a single year.

It's an apparent place holder - I call that a fudge factor - because there’s too many factors in play to accurately forecast - so it is the approach to bridging the funding gap until things become clearer. 

The Five-Year Financial Plan Bylaw - the budget and legal document that Council votes on and majority adopts shows the 2027 property tax levy at $265,860,476.

By 2030, the planned tax levy reaches $316,194,595 ; thats 56% higher than the 2025 audited actual. 

1B. Utility Fees 

Utility fees - water, sewer, drainage are the real household costs. 

They jumped from $101.8 million in 2023 to $175.1 million in 2025. 

In 2024 alone, this line increased by $57.2 million -  that’s 56% in twelve months.

A significant portion of sewer rate increases came from Metro Vancouver , the regional authority that manages sewage treatment for every member municipality. Metro Vancouver ran a substantial cost overrun on the major sewage treatment upgrade. NSWWTP (North Shore Waste Water Treatment Plant) 

Every municipality in the region including the Township was required to absorb its share. 

Those costs were passed directly to Township ratepayers through sewer bills. 

You paid for a construction overrun on a facility you have never heard of, gain no benefit from, managed by a body you did not directly elect - but its 2 represented directors, Eric Woodward and Steve Ferguson - would have had to cast a vote. 

The Township planned for $110.8 million in government grants over two years - BUT received less than half at $47.1 million.

The funding gap was $63.6 million over two years, across two consecutive five-year financial plans.

Planned Capital budgets across multiple years included senior government grants as confirmed funding. Grants from BC Housing, the federal government, and provincial infrastructure programs were built into project financing assumptions before applications were approved, before eligibility was confirmed, and most likely in some cases before programs even existed in final form.

When $63.6 million in expected money does not arrive, something has to give. 

In this case, three things gave:

• reserves were drawn down,

• and debt was added

• and/or projects were delayed

This financial impact doesn't show on a single line. It shows as reserves declining faster than planned, projects running over budget, and debt accumulating year over year. We’ll get to that later. 

1D. DCC’s, Shortfalls & Audit Reporting 

What are DCC’s? 

A brief summary;

Development Cost Charges are supposed to make new development pay for the infrastructure it requires — roads, sewers, water, drainage. That principle of course only holds if the rates reflect actual costs. 

The Township's DCC program has gone without a meaningful update from 2012 until 2020. The 2020 bylaw - itself a 79% increase,  was built on construction and land cost data from 2018. 

For the better part of a decade, new development infrastructure was being laid at then current prices, but charged at outdated and hugely under represented and undervalued costs. 

The difference didn't disappear, but contributes to a slowly widening funding gap which is eventually absorbed by the general capital program or operating costs and ultimately, by taxpayers.

When the Township moved to correct this in 2024 with increases of 46–81% by housing type, the updated bylaw was deferred in December 2024, then deferred again in November 2025 by de-adopting and re-adopting it to restart the in-stream protection clock.

Still charging at outdated rates.

In-stream applications continue paying pre-2024 rates until November 2026 at the earliest. The proposed replacement rates are actually 17–18% lower than even the 2024 rates. 

This remains a structural funding issue that in the end leaves taxpayers paying for the funding shortfall and has contributed significantly to  the Townships funding gap and the consequential debt challenges. Admittedly - DCC's are just one of many layers of costs that influence project viability. Developers pay DCC costs not just to the Township - but to Metro Vancouver as well (another layer). These in addition to several other fees and charges.

BUT As for reporting these; 

The Financial Audit shows two lines relating to DCC’s 

1. Infrastructure transferred by developers ($78.1M / $79.0M / $72.7M in 2023–2025)

When a developer completes a subdivision, they hand over the physical infrastructure,  roads, water mains, storm drains, sidewalks. The Township records this as revenue because it received something with value. 

This is not cash.

You cannot pay a firefighter's salary with a cul-de-sac. It adds zero operational flexibility. It does add maintenance obligations permanently, AND it inflates the reported annual surplus which is one reason the surplus numbers look stronger than the cash picture feels.

This line is DECLINED three years in a row: $78.1M -> $79.0M -> $72.7M. 

Less infrastructure being transferred each year.

2. Cash developer infrastructure fees ($34.8M / $11.8M / $39.5M in 2023–2025)

This is actual cash.

But it comes with a legal restriction under provincial law: it can only be spent on specific new infrastructure to support growth, roads, drainage, parks, water and sewer systems. 

It cannot pay wages. It cannot fund police or fire operations. It cannot reduce your property tax bill. It sits in a restricted fund and waits for eligible capital projects.

The year-to-year swing is enormous: $34.8M -> $11.8M ->  $39.5M. In 2024, cash collections dropped to $11.8 million against a financial plan that projected many times that amount. The capital program built on those projections would have had to be restructured mid-year to cover the gap created.

1E. COMMUNITY AMENITY CONTRIBUTIONS

What are they CAC’s 

Prior to the Province’s introduction of Bill 43 in 2023,  when the Township approved a developer's request to build more density than standard zoning allows taller buildings, more units per lot, higher floor-area ratios,  the developer is typically required to give something back to the community in exchange. 

Under the Township's policy, this could be cash, land, or physical amenities. 

Community Amenity Contributions.

Most municipalities in Metro Vancouver used CACs with published, transparent rates developers could factor into their financial models before buying land.

The Township used a discretionary, negotiated system where rates could even change mid-application and did, dramatically, in 2022 and again in 2024. 

Lorval Development Corp. was facing $32–39 million in CAC and fees added after they had already spent $190 million acquiring land and $26 million preparing the site. They sued the Township of course. A BC Supreme Court judge ruled the entire policy was illegal. The Township appealed. Then dropped the appeal in this past May.

The Province introduced an authorized charge for amenities ACC’s that are published, fixed, and knowable upfront. That part is a genuine improvement.

But it doesn't fix the money problem - the funding gaps created as a result.

The Township built Smith Athletic Park and the new LEC Ice and Dry Arenas before the money was there to pay for them. That cost $144 million in borrowed debt. The plan was to collect CAC payments from developers to pay it back. 

The NOW replacement tool, ACC’s cannot legally be used to retire debt on projects that are already built. That was confirmed during the Township's own legal review of the ACC Bylaw draft. The debt exists. The buildings exist. 

The legal mechanism to repay them using developer contributions does not.

This - is a major part is what has triggered our debt issue. 

The Township’s approach to CAC’s resulted with a $65–85 million unfunded hole inside it. Taxpayers are on the hook for the difference.

And the community centres people were promised,  Willoughby, Brookswood, Aldergrove, Willowbrook - are listed in the new ACC Bylaw, but without confirmed timelines, confirmed costs, or any answer to where the gap money comes from.

1F. One-Time Land Sales: The Revenue That Looked Like Strength

The Township's audited statements show that in the most recent fiscal year, the Township recorded $39.7M in asset disposals with a $35.4M gain ; meaning assets carried on the books at historical cost (often land acquired decades ago at a fraction of current value) were sold, generating a large accounting gain that flowed into the surplus figure.

On paper: strong year. 

In practice: the furniture was just sold to pay the rent.

To help fill that newly created funding gap

The Township occasionally sells land it has owned for decades. Because that land was bought long ago at old prices, the "gain" looks huge on paper. In the most recent year, that gain was $35.4 million, and it counted toward the surplus figure that makes the finances look healthy.

But selling an old asset is not the same as running a sustainable budget. You can only sell land once. When it's gone, it's gone. And if your budget was quietly counting on those proceeds to stay balanced, that's not financial management. 

That's as I mentioned, is selling the furniture to pay current bills.

What makes this worse is the lack of transparency.

There's no plain-language public report that tells you what was sold,

who bought it,

what independent appraisal confirmed the price,

and exactly where the money toward.

That information exists.

It should exist in a public council report before the sale is finalized - with all of Council fully aware of those details

When a municipality's reported strength is built on asset sales, developer contributions, and optimistic grant assumptions, rather than tax revenue actually covering the cost of services - the finances are not strong. These are warning signals.

And when the viable assets run out, and the grants don't come, and the tax levy has to catch up all at once?

Maybe a 22.8% projected spike in 2027?

Part of what's driving it is patching the budget with one-time revenue that can't repeat.

Governance Issues and Accelerated Approvals: 

Spending Committed Before the Numbers Were Stress-Tested

Compounding every revenue shortfall is the approval process itself - with a slate majority committed to keep the appearances up, projects moving and agenda moving forward that’s to be expected. 

Major capital projects, including those underpinning the debt, were advanced through council with little or no review, compressed timelines, limited public input, and hazy financial projections built on revenue assumptions that were, at best, optimistic and, at worst, unenforceable.

The CAC policy was never subjected to independent legal review before it was used as the financial foundation for borrowed infrastructure. 

DCC rates were not updated to reflect rising construction costs before projects designed around those rates were approved. 

Grant-dependent capital programs were not stress-tested against a scenario where grants arrived late or not at all.

Neighbourhood plans generating community facility commitments were approved without confirmed funding for those facilities.

This is not just a revenue problem. 

It is a governance problem. 

When the financial assumptions underlying a major borrowing decision are not reviewed, tested, or with adequate Council discussion, public input before the commitment is made, there is no check on whether the plan is sound.

The Township approved projects, borrowed the money, built the facilities and then discovered the revenue model didn't hold. 

By then, the debt was already on the books.

How It Adds Up…

Each gap looks containable in isolation:

    Outdated DCCs

    CAC shortfall

    Grant Shortfalls

    Accelerated approvals 

But these didn't happen in isolation. 

They happened simultaneously, across periods of rapid growth, with a capital program that kept expanding while the revenue tools supporting it were either under-performing, undervalued,  legally fragile, or aspirational. 

The result is a municipality that built faster than it could fund, 

borrowed to bridge gaps that were supposed to be temporary, 

is now carrying $584M in total debt, 

with $131.2M in net debt, $46–49M in annual debt payments, 

and a 22.8% tax levy spike projected for 2027, 

while still promising community centres it has no confirmed plan to finance.

If the Revenue lines are not supporting the capital and operational costs - there’s an ongoing structural funding issue that will only continue to put pressure on debt reliance, drawing down on reserves with inevitable tax payers carrying the costs.

COMING UP - Expenses, operational costs and debt servicing & Reserves